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Abstract
Across the world, organizations are required to comply with regulatory frameworks
dictating how to manage personal information. Despite these, several cases of data leaks
and exposition of private data to unauthorized recipients have been publicly and widely
advertised. For authorities and system administrators to check compliance to regulations,
auditing of private data processing becomes crucial in IT systems. Finding the origin of
some data, determining how some data is being used, checking that the processing of
some data is compatible with the purpose for which the data was captured are typical
functionality that an auditing capability should support, but diﬃcult to implement in a
reusable manner. Such questions are so-called provenance questions, where provenance
is deﬁned as the process that led to some data being produced. The aim of this paper
is to articulate how data provenance can be used as the underpinning approach of an
auditing capability in IT systems. We present a case study based on requirements of the
Data Protection Act and an application that audits the processing of private data, which
we apply to an example manipulating private data in a university.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Intensive deployment of information technology and generalized online facilities by means of the
Internet present amazing opportunities for businesses, governments and academic institutions such
as personalisation and customisation of services, directly targeted to their audience. To strike a balance
between the undoubted advantages of wider access to information and the protection of personal data,
legislators have been putting legal frameworks into place, mandating institutions to address the problem
of governance of their data management systems. (e.g UK Data Protection Act [8], EU [5], US Safe
Harbor [22] and HIPAA [21])
Despite such regulatory frameworks, several public and highly visible cases of data leaks and exposures
of private data to unintended recipients are inevitably breaking the population’s trust and conﬁdence in
such new infrastructures [16, 15]. Investigations for such cases have to answer complex questions, such
as establishing how an IT system allowed an individual to access, process, or communicate speciﬁc data.
Hence, in light of those cases, legislators are considering more stringent powers to police institutions
and enforce compliance [17].
Against such background, auditing the use of private data becomes a crucial capability for IT systems
that brings trust and supports multiple usages. (i) In a forensic context, where a privacy breach
is investigated, accurate auditing allows the complete case to be replayed and analysed, so as to
understand the origin of the problem and its exact causes. (ii) In a law enforcement context, auditing
oﬀers inspection powers with which the behaviour of systems can be checked to be compliant, using
exhaustive case reviews or by statistical sampling. (iii) From a governance viewpoint, it is good practice
for institutions to set up policies and monitor their eﬀectiveness by means of auditing capabilities. (iv)
In the presence of outsourcing, auditing capabilities may be required by a data controller in order to
audit the behaviour of a subcontractor, actions of whom it may be responsible for. (v) When auditing
is continuous, alarms can be put in place if executions are not compatible with policies.
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Understanding the causes of a breach, ﬁnding the origin of some data, checking that the processing
of some data is compatible with the purpose for which the data was captured are all typical questions
that an auditing capability should support. Such questions are also so-called provenance questions [12].
Provenance captures causal dependencies between data and events in computer systems, explaining
what contributed to a piece of data in a speciﬁc state [13]. With such an explicit representation, it
becomes possible to interpret and judge the quality of data, and consequently derived trust in results
produced by applications.
Hence, the aim of this paper is to expose the principles by which data provenance can help audit
the processing of private data in IT systems. Speciﬁcally, the contributions of this paper are: (i)
A set of auditing use cases for private data use. (ii) A provenance-based architecture for auditing.
(iii) A provenance-based application for auditing the processing of private data. The structure of this
paper as follows. In Section 2, the Data Protection Act is brieﬂy explained and three of its principles
are analysed to expose their auditing requirements. In Section 3, the provenance concept and the
provenance approach are explained, as well as, the methodology used for creating provenance-aware
applications. In Section 4, an architecture of a provenance-based auditing system is presented to explain
how provenance can help perform the auditing process. In Section 5, a provenance-based application
for auditing the processing of private information based on the requirements explained in Section 2 is
presented. Also, some associated results are presented and explained. Finally, Section 6 discusses some
related work and Section 7 outlines future work and oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2. CASE STUDY: DATA PROTECTION ACT
In this section, the Data Protection Act’s principles related to audit the processing of private data are
presented as a case study. The reason for adopting this case study is that the Data Protection Act
(DPA) is the main legislative framework related to information privacy in computer systems in the UK.
First we brieﬂy introduce the DPA and, then an analysis of the selected DPA’s principles is discussed
to expose their auditing requirements. Finally, an example of the use of DPA is explained. Such an
example will be used in the next sections to explain the audit process.
2.1. Introduction to the Data Protection Act
The DPA 1998 provides protection for an individual’s personal information placing restrictions on how
organisations can use personal information that they hold - including how they acquire, store, share
or dispose of it. The UK’s DPA is an implementation of the European directive [5] that enforces the
protection of an individual’s personal data as it is processed or moved between Member States of the
European Union.
The DPA deﬁnes three entities that are involved in the processing of information: the Data Controller
(DC) is the individual or organisation that decides the purpose for which, and the manner in which,
personal information is to be processed; the Data Subject (DS) is an individual whose information is
held by DC; and the Data Processor (DP) is any individual or organisation, other than an employee
of DC, that processes personal data on behalf of DC. The information processed by these entities is
classiﬁed into two types. Personal data (or personal information) is any information related to a living
individual that can be used to identify that individual. Sensitive personal data is a special subclass of
personal data that can only be processed under certain conditions. Examples of this type are: racial
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, physical and mental condition, sexual life, oﬀences,
etc. The ways of processing personal information include obtaining, recording, holding or carrying out
any operations. For collecting and processing personal data, DC has to declare a purpose: a purpose
is the intention for which the data is to be processed. The consequence of processing personal data is
called result. Thus, there are two types of data: collected data that is the information obtained from
DS and used data that is the information used in the processing of a result. Note that the DPA was
mainly created to evaluate the performance of DC and DP, thus the actions performed by the DS are
not audited. Hence, the work presented in this paper is based on that assumption.
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2.2. Auditing Requirements
An audit is an evaluation of an organization or system performed to ascertain the validity and reliability
of its information and provide an assessment of its operations. The goal of an audit is to express an
opinion about the organization or system under evaluation, based on accepted standards, legislative
frameworks, or mutual policies. An audit is performed by an entity known as auditor, who then issues
a report on the results of the audit. In the case of the DPA, the Information Commissioner plays the
role of auditor [8] that assesses the compliance to the DPA principles.
This section analyses three of the DPA’s eight principles (see [8] for the full list): Principle 2, 3 and
7, which introduce requirements for auditing private data processing. Each principle is analysed to
derive its respective requirement. Such an analysis was made taking information from specialised papers
[1, 3, 20, 6] and verifying their correct application with experts in the area.
Principle 2 Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more speciﬁed and lawful purposes, and
shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes.
In Principle 2, the DC may only request data from DS for a legal purpose. When DS receives a DC
request, DS has to verify the request and decide whether to send the required information or not. If DS
decides to accept the request, then DS is giving her/his consent to process the information just for the
given purpose. When DC receives the information, such information can only be processed according to
the purpose agreed by DS. After processing the information, an auditor can verify that the processing
made by DC or by DP (if the processing was outsourced) was really the same stated in the purpose.
This provides us with an auditing requirement:
Requirement A (Purpose Veriﬁcation) For verifying that DC and DP used DS’s information only
for the stated purpose, we require an explicit description of the processing that was applied to such
information. This description has to show the processes applied to produce a result and the corresponding
purposes. Thus, the description can be used by auditors to verify that the processes applied to each
piece of information were compatible with the stated purposes. Moreover, auditors can verify if the
DC’s purposes are legal.
Principle 3 Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or
purposes for which they are processed.
In Principle 3, the data requested from DS has to be relevant for the stated purpose. DC should not
request, collect or use more information than required. When data processing is complete, an auditor
can verify that all the data used by DC (or by DP, in the case of an outsourced processing) was relevant.
Hence, we derive a new auditing requirement:
Requirement B (Relevant Information Veriﬁcation) For verifying that DC and DP used only relevant
information when processing data, we require a description of the information used to derive a speciﬁc
result. The relevance of the information used is determined by the purpose. Then, an auditor can use
the description to verify which information was used in the process of a result and decide the relevance
of such information to the purpose.
Principle 7 Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised
or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to,
personal data.
According to Principle 7, DC has to oﬀer technical and organizational measures for managing DS’s
data, a set of controls comprising the best practice in information security, as explained in ISO- 17799
[9]. All the organizational and administrative measures are beyond the scope of our work. We are
focusing on the technical measures, speciﬁcally on the measures relating to the basic information
security characteristics deﬁned in ISO-7498-2 [10]. These are secrecy, integrity, authentication, non-
repudiation and access control. Thus, auditors should be able to verify that the entities in the DPA are
transporting information in a secure way, i.e. applying the basic information security characteristics to
the information managed.
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Requirement C (Basic Security Characteristics Veriﬁcation) For verifying that DS, DC and DP
are implementing the basic security characteristics in network communications, we require an explicit
description of the related security process applied to data. This description can be used by auditors to
verify which security characteristics have been used during the processing of information.
2.3. Application example
This section presents an example of the application of the DPA in the management of personal
information by a university. The university (Data Controller) requests personal information from its
students (Data Subjects) to provide an educational service (purpose). The information requested is
personal details that include name, address, age, sex, nationality and school. The purpose of providing
education includes “statistical processing” comprising: average of ages, average of age in each school,
number of international students (by school), number of national students (by school), etc. These
statistics could be calculated, among others, to support freedom of information requests, to monitor
equal opportunity practices or to inﬂuence recruitment strategies. In our speciﬁc case, the university
performs itself the task of calculating the statistics to a specialised external organisation (concretely, the
Data Processor is the “Admissions and Students Data” unit, but in other scenarios such processing could
be outsourced to a third party). Then, the age of each student is sent to such a unit that calculates their
average (average of ages). The information requested by the university is considered private; therefore,
the DPA should be applied in the processing of such information including the performing of audits to
verify that the university really processes the requested information based on the purpose.
Note that, this example could be mapped into many diﬀerent real life applications that manage personal
information, e.g. government procedures, scholar registers, buying goods in Internet, facebook, etc. For
more information about organisations’ purposes consult the Information Commissioner’s Oﬃce web
page [18].
Summarising, if systems were equipped with capabilities supporting requirements A, B and C, auditors
would be allowed to evaluate the actions and events related to processing of private information to
ascertain the degree of correspondence between such actions and an established criteria. Thus, it would
become possible to ﬁnd a breach in the compliance to the established criteria. Now, performing such
an audit using an automated tool would make this procedure easier, faster and more trustworthy. To do
so, a description of past processing applied to data would be necessary: this is exactly what provenance
technology oﬀers us. In the next section, we introduce the concept of provenance and its principles, as
an approach that allows us to implement the mentioned requirements to perform automated audits.
3. PRINCIPLES OF PROVENANCE
In Section 2, we have identiﬁed three auditing requirements derived from the DPA. These requirements
have in common the need for an explicit description of past processes and the identiﬁcation of the
information used to generate a speciﬁc result. To provide for these needs, we advocate the use of
Provenance, which we now present.
3.1. Concept of provenance
The word provenance is used in diverse areas, such art, archaeology and palaeontology, for describing
the history of custody of an object since its creation, including any successive changes made to it.
It is necessary to have documented evidence of such events to establish that this object has not
been altered and it is not a forgery or a reproduction. The main purpose of this documentation is to
prove that a speciﬁc object really comes from where it is thought to originate from, in other words,
that it is authentic. This same concept of provenance also applies to data generated within computer
applications to determine the origin of a computational result and its event history. Thus, provenance
can be deﬁned as: “The provenance of a piece of data is the process that led to that piece of data.” [7] To
support such vision, computational applications need to capture extra information that describes what
actually occurred at execution time; such extra information is referred to as process documentation. A
provenance-aware application can be deﬁned as an application that besides doing the task for which it
was designed, also records process documentation during its execution. Such documentation is recorded
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in a storage component, provenance store, and queried to obtain the provenance of some data. Process
documentation consists of a set of assertions, called p-assertions, asserted by the components of an
application. There are two types of them: Interaction P-Assertion is a description of the contents of a
message by an actor that has sent or received such message and Relationship P-Assertion is a description
of how an actor obtained output data sent in an interaction, by applying some function or algorithm to
input data from other interactions. [7]
The entity that takes responsibility for recording process documentation is called the asserter, whereas
the entity issuing queries is referred to as the querier. Provenance queries are user-tailored queries
over process documentation aimed to obtain the provenance of electronic data [13]. The intent of a
provenance query is to select a set of p-assertions, which we refer to as query result, that provides the
provenance of a speciﬁc piece of data. Such speciﬁc piece of data for which provenance is sought is
referred to as data item. Not all the p-assertions related to the data item are part of a query result, just
the ones that belong to a predeﬁned context called scope. A query result is represented by a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) that indicates where and how the data was used. Such a DAG starts with the
data item followed by the relationships in scope that represent the processes that result in such data
item. Thus, following relationships in a DAG helps us identify how a data item was produced. Figure
4 gives an example of such a DAG, which we will explain later in the paper. Therefore, a DAG is the
representation of the provenance of a piece of data which allows users to understand what exactly
happened with the data.
3.2. PrIMe
In this section, we introduce the Provenance Incorporating Methodology (PrIMe) [14] a software
engineering methodology, which is applied at design stage, for adapting applications to make them
provenance aware. PrIMe is divided into three phases: provenance question capture and analysis, actor
based decomposition and adapting the application.
Phase 1 Provenance Question Capture and Analysis. In the ﬁrst phase of PrIMe, an analysis of the
application identiﬁes the provenance related questions to be answered about the application. Likewise,
the information for which provenance is sought is characterised as well as the answer’s scope.
Phase 2 Actor Based Decomposition. In the second phase of PrIMe, the application is conceptually
decomposed into a set of actors, which record process documentation. After that, their interactions
are analysed to ﬁnd the relationships between these interactions. This analysis exposes the information
ﬂow within the application. For this purpose, PrIMe uses a graph-based representation of application
interactions. The next step is to determine which application actors are involved in the provenance of a
given data item: these actors are called knowledgeable actors. If the information necessary for answering
the provenance questions is available from the current actors, then it is time to apply the Phase 3. If
not, Phase 2 has to be repeated until the correct level of granularity to answer provenance questions is
reached.
Phase 3 Adapting the Application. This phase involves adapting the application in order to make
explicit those information items that are currently implicit, hereby giving the application the necessary
functionality to record process documentation, which in turn allows actors to perform queries on the
documentation in order to answer provenance questions.
Equipped with this methodology, we can now fully exploit the previously explained provenance approach
for developing provenance-aware applications. Thus, the PrIMe methodology will be used to provide
support to the auditing requirements. In the next section, a Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
based on the DPA is presented. Such an architecture includes the described provenance approach to
show how it helps perform auditing processes.
4. PROVENANCE-BASED AUDITING ARCHITECTURE
This section presents a Provenance-based Auditing Architecture for auditing the processing of private
data. Such an architecture was created based on the DPA case study, which was presented in Section 2.
The architecture shows the entities involved in the processing of private information and their relation
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FIGURE 1: Provenance-based Auditing Architecture
with the auditing use cases. Hence, the architecture is presented as a use case diagram that shows the
relationship between the entities and the auditing requirements.
Figure 1 shows the Provenance-based Auditing Architecture with four actors: Data Subject, Data
Controller, Data Processor, Auditor and two databases: Local Database and Provenance
Store. DS is represented by the Data Subject actor that is a software proxy representing a user that
communicates with the Data Controller actor, which represents DC, through the Data Request and
the Data Update processes. The Data Request process represents a request for personal information
issued by the DC to the DS. Data Controller requests information from Data Subject, then Data
Subject sends this information which Data Controller stores in a local database represented by
the actor Local Database. The Data Update process represents the updating process performed by
DS: if for some reason the Data Subject information, which is stored in Local Database by Data
Controller, has changed, then Data Subject sends such new information to Data Controller. DP
is represented by the Data Processor actor that communicates with the Data Controller using the
Task Request process representing a task delegated to DP by DC. The p-assertions generated by the
Data Subject, Data Controller and Data Processor actors during their execution are recorded
in the Provenance Store. This process is represented by the record arrows that connect the actors
with the Provenance Store. Additionally, in the Provenance Store references to the original data are
recorded instead of the whole original information. Thus, Provenance Store has a link with Local
Database to solve such data references that a query result has. Finally, the Auditor actor is a software
proxy representing an auditor who wants to verify the compliance to the principles mentioned in section
2. Then Auditor has three auditing requirement to verify: Purpose Verification, Information
Verification and Security Verification representing Requirement A, B and C, respectively. The
three requirements can be veriﬁed by querying the p-assertions stored in the Provenance Store. By this
reason, the Auditing System has a link with the Provenance Store representing the querying of
p-assertions. By querying the p-assertions already recorded in the Provenance Store, the auditor can
obtain a description of the process that was applied to a speciﬁc piece of information and make the
necessary checks.
In this section, we have deﬁned a Provenance-based Architecture for auditing the processing of private
data based on the requirements presented in Section 2. The next step is to apply PrIMe to build a
provenance-based application that implements the presented architecture and allows us to verify auditing
requirements. Thus, in the next section we describe such an application that was designed using PrIMe
methodology.
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5. PROVENANCE-BASED APPLICATION: ANSWERING PROVENANCE QUERIES
Using PrIMe, we design a provenance-based application for auditing the processing of private data based
on the example of Section 2.3 and the architecture presented in Section 4. Such an application provides
support to examine the auditing requirements presented in Section 2. Due to space restrictions, in this
section we only present the design obtained from the application of PrIMe and the query results obtained
from the application. For clarity reasons, such queries are explained using the example of processing
private information presented in Section 2.3: a university requests private information from its students
for carrying out statistics.
Phase 1 Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the provenance related questions, which are derived from the auditing
requirements. Each table presents a provenance question and its corresponding provenance query or
queries. The data item and the scope are deﬁned to delimit the results from the provenance query.
Finally, a processing step is explained, when required to answer provenance questions.
Table 1 presents the provenance question that checks that a speciﬁc result was obtained by processing
personal data that is compatible with the purpose for which it was captured. This query covers
Requirement A, Purpose Veriﬁcation. Table 2 presents the provenance questions that check that
all the personal data captured from DS were used to obtain result. This provenance question is related
to the Requirement B, Relevant Information Veriﬁcation.Table 3 presents the provenance question
that checks if the process to obtain a speciﬁc result received the basic security characteristics. This
question is related to Requirement C, Basic Security Characteristics Veriﬁcation.
TABLE 1: Provenance related question of Requirement A
Provenance Question Verify that the result was obtained by processing personal data that is
compatible with the purpose for which it was captured.
Provenance Query What was the used data and the purpose to obtain result?
Data item Result
Scope Requested and collected data
Processing step Compare used data with an established criteria related to the purpose.
TABLE 2: Provenance related question of Requirement B
Provenance Question Was all the collected data used in the processing of result?
Provenance Query What was the used data and the collected data used to obtain result?
Data item Result
Scope Requested and collected data
Processing step Compare the used data with the collected data and highlight the diﬀerences.
Any diﬀerence means data collected but not used or used but not collected.
TABLE 3: Provenance related question of Requirement C
Provenance Question Check if the used data to obtain result was encrypted, signed,decrypted, etc.
Provenance Query What was the used data and the security processes applied to it?
Data item Result
Scope Provenance of result with security processes
Processing step Check that data was encrypted, veriﬁed, etc.
Phase 2 In the second phase of PrIMe, actor-based decomposition, resulted in the graph showed in
Figure 2. This ﬁgure presents the graph of the basic communication established between the main
entities of the DPA. The graph has three actors: DC (Data Controller), DS (Data Subject) and DP
(Data Processor). Information ﬂows in four messages denoted M8, M11, M23 and M26. In M8, DC sends
the purpose of collection to DS. Then, in M11, DS sends the required data to DC. These two messages
are the main part of the Data Request process that represents the request of personal data. Then, in
M23, DC sends a set of data (which includes the data of M11) that is processed by DP, and followed
by the result to DC in M26. These messages are part of the Task Request process that represents the
outsourcing of a job. Both processes can be seen in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 2: Phase 2 Graph
Figure 2 also presents the relationships between the messages, denoted R3, R6, R7 and R8: R3 indicates
that M11 was sent based on M8, i.e. purpose; R6 indicates that M23 was sent justiﬁed by M8, i.e. purpose;
R7 indicates that the content of M23 (Process data) has an element of the data in M11; and R8 indicates
that the content of M26 (Result) is the result of an operation applied to the data in M23. Note that in
Figure 2 the messages related to security do not appear in the graph, they will be included in the next
phase.
Phase 3 PrIMe third phase adapts the application in order to help make explicit those information
items that are currently implicit. In our case, the initial graph shown in Figure 2 does not have explicit
information about the security functions applied to the data, which is necessary to answer the provenance
query shown in Table 3. Therefore, the graph was modiﬁed by including a new local actor called Security
Entity which makes explicit the information related to security. Figure 3 presents the new graph with
local security entities and security functions showing the interactions and the relationships of the entire
process. In this ﬁgure, the sent - received messages, by which interaction p-assertions can be inferred,
are represented by solid arrows, and relationship p-assertions are represented by dashed arrows. The
local security entity performs all the operations related to security (encryption, decryption, sign, verify,
etc). Thus, DC, DS, and DP are each associated with a local security entity, called DCSec, DSSec and
DPSec respectively.
In Figure 3 the assertions related to security functions haven been included. The protocol TLS [2]
(Transport Layer Security) is used to establish communication between entities. This protocol allows
the entities involved to verify each others’ certiﬁcates and create a session key based on their public
and private keys which are used to encrypt/decrypt every message. Moreover, the messages have the
secrecy property using data encryption. Also, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation properties
are provided by the use of digital signatures. These properties are achieved with the use of public and
private keys. Therefore, each message is signed and veriﬁed after which it may be accepted. Access
control is implemented with public certiﬁcates. Every entity has access to the granted resources after
verifying its identity through its certiﬁcate. As a result, in Figure 3, M2, M5 (between DC and DS), M17
and M20 (between DC and DP) have made explicit the implementation of TLS protocol. The messages
sent between entities and their corresponding local security entities represent the encryption, decryption,
signing, and veriﬁcation processes. Therefore, the messages sent between DC-DS and DC-DP, which are
transported over a network, are encrypted and signed before being sent, and veriﬁed and decrypted
after being received. Due to space restrictions, in this diagram, we do not show the processes that
encrypt/decrypt and verify/sign the p-assertions. However, these security properties are applied to the
p-assertions for protecting them in their transportation to the Provenance Store.
After recording interaction p-assertions and relationship p-assertions, queries were constructed based
on Tables 1, 2 and 3. The results of the queries consist of DAGs displayed in ﬁgures 4 and 5. To explain
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FIGURE 3: Phase 3 Graph
how to audit the processing of private data using such queries, we use the example presented in Section
2.3.
To answer the provenance questions in Table 1 and Table 2, it is necessary to identify two kinds of data:
used data and collected data. Collected data is the information sent by DS to DC (M11), as a result of
request (M2). Used data is the information sent by DC to DP that is contained in M23 and used to obtain
a result (M26), which is the consequence of processing the requested data. Note that used data is a
subset of collected data and message M23 could contain more information than such used data (e.g.
instruction of processing, information necessary for performing the processing). Therefore, such extra
information is not private and is out of the auditing process.
To answer these questions, the assertions related to security are not necessary. Therefore, a provenance
query should obtain a DAG of Result without security operations. Figure 4 shows such a DAG: at its
right, we display the piece of data whose provenance is sought, in this case averageAge. Relationships
by which this result was obtained are shown in bold, whereas the data related with each relationship is
shown in normal text. Used data is identiﬁed in the DAG with a solid oval and collected data with a
dashed oval. The message number (related to Figure 3) in which the data is transported is denoted by
Mi.
For answering Table 1 question, we need to identify the used data to obtain averageAge, which is
age1, and the purpose, which is “statistical processing”, which includes “averages of ages”. If we follow
the arrows in Figure 4, we can see that averageAge is an average of ages (age1, age2, age3), which
is the used data, and in the case of “age1”, this operation was justiﬁed by the purpose “statistical
processing”. Then we can aﬃrm that averageAge was processed following Principle 2.
For answering Table 2 question, we need to identify the used data to obtain averageAge, which is age1,
and the collected data, which is name, age, nationality, school. If we compare them, then we can see
that they are diﬀerent. The reason is that the purpose “statistical processing” includes diﬀerent tasks
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FIGURE 4: Provenance DAG of averageAge without security operations
besides “average of ages” (e.g. the average of age in each school, the number of international students,
etc). Therefore, name, nationality, and school have to be processed in accordance to the established
purpose, “statistical processing”, to be in compliance with Principle 3. For example, to use nationality
for processing the number of international students or school for processing the average age in each
school.
To answer the provenance question in Table 3 it is necessary to show the provenance of averageAge
with security operations, as in Figure 5. In Figure 5, the encrypted data is marked with a parallelogram,
the plain data with a rectangle and the message number (related to Figure 3) in which the data is
transported is denoted by Mi.
The encryption/signing relationship is denoted encSignIn and the veriﬁcation/ decryption relationship
is denoted verDecIn. Thus, when a data is signed and encrypted before being sent and an entity receives
such data (cryptodata), the entity has to verify the sign and decrypt the data to obtain and process
the plain data in some way. Thus, if the DAG of a data has the relationships encSignIn and verDecIn,
then such data was transported using a complete digital signature scheme. In this way, the audit can
ascertain that some data oﬀers security characteristics (in this case: secrecy, integrity, authentication,
and non-repudiation), as required by Requirement C.
In Figure 5, the data item is cryptoaverageAge, which is the same data item as the showed in Figure 4
but signed and encrypted. If we follow the arrows in the ﬁgure, we can see that cryptoaverageAge is the
result of the encryption/signing of plainaverageAge, which is the averageOf plainAge. And plainAge
is the result of the veriﬁcation/decryption of cryptoage1. Therefore, in Figure 5 cryptoaverageAge was
processed using information that was transported using a digital signature scheme. Then, we can aﬃrm


































FIGURE 5: Provenance DAG of cryptoaverageAge with security operations
To summarise, we have presented the design and the results of a provenance-based application for
auditing the processing of private data that allow us to verify if the processing of information is
in compliance to a legislative framework. We have also made explicit security characteristics in
the processing of data to cover the presented auditing requirements. Moreover, including security
characteristics to the application allows auditors to trust in the retrieved information during the
veriﬁcation of the processing of private information.
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6. RELATED WORK
The traditional way of auditing includes a qualiﬁed auditor who assesses the degree of compliance
of a pre-deﬁned set of speciﬁcations. This assessment is a “hand-made” process that follows certain
procedures established by standards. These procedures are long and, because of the human intervention,
prone to errors. In order to increase eﬃciency and to allow for continuous auditing, many researchers
[19, 4, 11, 23] have proposed to automate the auditing processes using diﬀerent technologies.
Philip et al [19] and Chorley et al [4] propose the idea of using provenance to create audit reports
related to Evidence-Based Policy Assessment (EBPA). They suggest using provenance to evaluate the
quality and reliability of data, the robustness of an analysis, and the validity of ﬁndings in an assessment.
However, they do not present any analysis that shows how to use provenance in this speciﬁc ﬁeld.
Kifor et al [11] proposes the use of provenance in electronic healthcare record systems. The authors also
investigate the privacy risk aspects of introducing provenance into healthcare systems. They propose not
to store sensitive medical data in the provenance store, but only references, to avoid unauthorized users
being able to link some piece of medical data with an identiﬁable person. The described technique is
already applied in our work, not only for security reasons but also for scalability. The approach of using
provenance information for making audits is mentioned but not fully discussed. They neither present
any audit use case nor present an analysis of the security characteristics. They mention the HIPAA
regulation, however, our design can be applied to such a regulation.
Xie et al [23] proposes the use of a probabilistic integrity audit method to verify query integrity
in outsourced databases. The authors present the use of this method to verify the correctness and
completeness of queries in outsourced databases reducing costly requirements of sending back query
results. This method could complement our work by using it to verify the correctness and completeness
of the queries in the provenance store. However, we are focusing on how to audit the use of private
data in an automatic way and the security characteristics that we include in the application allows us
to have a certain level of trust in the audit results.
7. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
Our work demonstrates that the use of provenance technologies provides an appropriate tool for an
automated veriﬁcation of the compliance not only of the DPA, but also of other legislative frameworks
related to processing of private information (e.g. [22],[21]). Our aim is to provide an easy way to audit
the correct use of private personal information in distributed systems. Hence, this research deﬁnes a
Provenance-Based Architecture for Auditing and presents a provenance-based application for auditing
processing of private data. Thus, part of our future work is to evaluate the presented architecture and
application to strengthen our proposal. As well, part of this work is to develop a provenance-based
generic middleware to audit the processing of private information that can be used in applications
independently of platforms and programming languages. On the other hand, raising the level of trust in
the query result can be achieved by creating a formalisation of the presented architecture. Besides, to
make use of ontologies to deﬁne purposes, collect data, used data, etc. in the DAGs can help perform
an automatic analysis of such DAGs.
In summary, this document describes the application of provenance concepts to audit private data
processing in distributed applications. It presents the Data Protection Act as a case study and a
requirement analysis of three of its principles that are related to auditing procedures. These requirements
were modelled for presenting a provenance-based architecture and showing how provenance can help
the auditing process. A provenance-based application was developed using the presented provenance
approach and some associated query results, which are in the form of a DAG, were presented. These
results were analysed to show that provenance can be used as a means for auditing the correct
processing of private information. Thus, the presented provenance-based application provides a means
for verifying that organizations are in compliance with legislative frameworks related to processing
private information.
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